Vendor description
"Unify is the Atos brand for communication and collaboration solutions Unify is the newest member of the Atos family, combining Atos’ knowledge and reputation in the IT services market with Unify’s expertise in unified communications and collaboration to provide customers with seamless services solutions for their entire digital portfolio. Within Atos, Unify continues to deliver a unique integrated proposition for unified communications and real time capabilities."
Source: unify.com/en/expert/unify
Business recommendation
SEC Consult recommends users of this solution to immediately install the latest patch from the vendor. Furthermore, an in-depth security analysis performed by security professionals is highly advised, as the software may be affected from other security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description
1) Argument injection leading to unauthenticated RCE and authentication bypass (CVE-2023-6269)
The administrative web interface insufficiently escapes supplied login credentials before passing them to a user management application, leading to an unauthenticated attacker being able to gain root access to the appliance via SSH.
Another possibility to exploit this vulnerability is to append a special argument during logon to completely bypass the authentication of the web interface. A previously unauthenticated attacker can logon as administrator without any known credentials.
Proof of concept
1) Argument injection leading to unauthenticated RCE and authentication bypass (CVE-2023-6269)
Example 1) Gaining unauthenticated SSH root access
The file receiving data from the login page is `auth.php`, here the user-provided credentials are passed on to the function `PasswordMgr::authPassword` after some checks on the supplied username.
// /srv/www/htdocs/auth.php
// [...]
$ret=false;
$real_user='';
$error = '';
$local_user=strip_tags($_POST['username']);
// [...]
if( !sessionLimitReached() )
{
// Authenticate user/password...
$privilege = PasswordMgr::getUserPrivilege($local_user);
if (($local_user == 'assistant') || ($local_user == 'cdr') || (!PasswordMgr::isUserEnabled($local_user))){
$ret = false;
}
else {
switch ($privilege) {
case 'admin':
$ret = PasswordMgr::authPassword($_POST["username"], $_POST["password"], $error, $real_user, $local_user, FALSE);
break;
// [...]
}
}
// [...]
}
// [...] The function `PasswordMgr::authPassword` in `core/PasswordMgr.php` is just a wrapper around `call_osbpasswd` in the same file.
// /srv/www/htdocs/core/PasswordMgr.php
public static function authPassword($username, $password, &$error, &$real_user, &$local_user, $local = FALSE)
{
$error='';
if ( PasswordMgr::call_osbpasswd("auth", $username, $password, $error, $real_user, $local_user, $local ) )
{
$error='Current Password does not match user';
return false;
}
return true;
}The function `call_osbpasswd` is responsible for anything related to user management, it does this by constructing shell arguments and supplying them to the executable `/osb/bin/osbpasswd` which is executed with root privileges via `cfgUtilExecSudo`. This executable handles the actual authentication, creation of users, and other tasks.
In the case of authentication the arguments are written to a temporary file and read from there. Before that the supplied password is escaped using `escapeshellcmd` instead of `escapeshellarg`. This means that space characters (hex 0x20) in the password are left intact allowing for argument injection.
// /srv/www/htdocs/core/PasswordMgr.php
public static function call_osbpasswd( $method, $username, $password, &$output, &$real_user, &$local_user, $local, $extraArg = '' )
{
// [...]
$curruser = 'GUI';
// [...]
$params = "$method";
if ($local) $params .= ' --local';
if ($username != '') $params .= " --user $username";
if ($curruser != '') $params .= " --curruser $curruser";
if ($extraArg != '') $params .= "$extraArg";
$file = '';
// [...]
else {
$params .= " --password ";
$fakePar = $params."xxxxxx";
$params .= escapeshellcmd($password);
$params .= "\n";
$file = tempnam('/osb/var/tmp','osbpasswd.'.md5($params).'.');
/*E.g.: /opt/openbranch/var/tmp/osbpasswd.f9e2a9fcf29c6275830257316d560e27.CG4IcQ */
cfgUtilEcho( $params, $file );
$command = "/osb/bin/osbpasswd ".$fakePar." --file ".$file;
}
$outArray = array();
$ret = cfgUtilExecSudo($command, $outArray, FALSE, TRUE);
// [...]
return $ret;
}The function that is responsible for parsing command line arguments in the called application `/osb/bin/osbpasswd` iterates over arguments and sets global variables based on them. This is done in a loop and no check is done if that argument was already set. This means an attacker can override all parameters by specifying them again.
int parse_arguments(int argc, char **argv, int n)
{
// [...]
while ( n < argc && argv[n] ) {
// [...]
else if ( !strcmp("--user", argv[n]) ) {
if ( ++n < argc )
arg_user = argv[n];
}
else if ( !strcmp("--shell", argv[n]) ) {
if ( ++n < argc )
arg_shell = argv[n];
}
// [...]
else if ( !strcmp("auth", argv[n]) ) {
arg_command_name = argv[n];
arg_command_number = 1;
}
else if ( !strcmp("add", argv[n]) ) {
arg_command_name = argv[n];
arg_command_number = 6;
}
// [...]
++n;
}
return 0LL;
}The combination of faulty escaping of the supplied password and overly permissive parsing of arguments in the called binary leads to an attacker being able to request arbitrary operations from the `/osb/bin/osbpasswd` binary with arbitrary arguments. An attacker could for example create a new user with SSH access and change the password of the root user leading to a complete compromise of the system.
To demonstrate the vulnerability, it is sufficient to [...]
[ Proof of concept removed ]- this creates a new user with SSH access, the second one [...]
[ Proof of concept removed ]which changes the password of the root user. The attacker can then login [...] to gain root access.
Example 2) Bypassing the web interface logon as administrator
As described in example 1, the same vulnerability can also be exploited to
bypass the logon for the web interface and immediately gain access as
administrator because the arguments for the command-line tool are passed and
evaluated.
By supplying the [...] following [...] string [...], it is possible to logon without known credentials:
[ Proof of concept removed ][...]
Afterwards the attacker is logged on as administrator (or any other supplied user account).
Vulnerable / tested versions
The following version has been tested which was the latest version available at the time of the test:
- Atos Unify OpenScape Session Border Controler (SBC) Firmware Version V10 R3.3.0
According to vendor, versions before V10 R3.3.0 are affected as well.
The vendor confirmed that the following products are vulnerable:
- Atos Unify OpenScape SBC V10 before V10 R3.4.0
- Atos Unify OpenScape Branch V10 before V10 R3.4.0
- Atos Unify OpenScape BCF V10 before V10R10.12.00 and V10R11.05.02